Abstract. This paper studies an abduction problem in formal argumentation frameworks. Given an argument, an agent verifies whether the argument is justified or not in its argumentation framework. If the argument is not justified, the agent seeks conditions to explain the argument in its argumentation framework. We formulate such abductive reasoning in argumentation semantics and provide its computation in logic programming. Next we apply abduction in argumentation frameworks to reasoning by players in debate games. In debate games, two players have their own argumentation frameworks and each player builds claims to refute the opponent. A player may provide false or inaccurate arguments as a tactic to win the game. We show that abduction is used not only for seeking counter-claims but also for building dishonest claims in debate games.
Introduction
Arguments and explanations play different roles in human reasoning and have been distinguished in philosophy of science. According to [15] , "the purpose of an explanation is to show why and how some phenomenon occurred or some event happened; the purpose of an argument is to show that some view or statement is correct or true." In other words, "argument is the mechanism by which we produce knowledge" and "explanation is the mechanism by which we produce understanding" [20] . On the other hand, an argument is used for knowing whether an explanation is appropriate and an explanation is used for understanding how an evidence occurs in an argument. In this sense, arguments and explanations are mutually supportive, so "arguments and explanations have a complementary relationship and reasoning is normally perceived as incomplete when one occurs in the absence of the other" [20] .
An argumentation framework introduced by Dung [12] provides an abstract framework for argumentative reasoning, and has been used for modelling various aspects of artificial intelligence including dialogue systems and legal reasoning. However, Dung's argumentation framework does not have a mechanism of reasoning about explanations or abductive reasoning, so that incorporating an explanatory mechanism into an argumentation framework is important and meaningful. With this background, this paper studies an abductive framework based on Dung's abstract argumentation. The proposed framework is useful for verifying whether a particular argument is justified or not, and seeking conditions to explain a particular argument in an argumentation framework. We next apply the abductive framework to reasoning by players in debate games [24] .
There is a one-to-one correspondence between the set in(L) with a complete (resp. stable, semi-stable, grounded, preferred) labelling L of an argumentation framework AF and a complete (resp. stable, semi-stable, grounded, preferred) extension of AF [9, 12] . In this paper, distinction among different labellings is often unimportant and S-labelling means one of the five labellings introduced above. Definition 2.5 (justify). [2] Let AF be an argumentation framework. Then, a labelled argument L is skeptically (resp. credulously) justified by AF under the S-labelling if L is included in every (resp. some) S-labelling L of AF .
Abduction in Argumentation Framework

Explanations
Suppose the following dialogue between Alice and Bob:
Alice: "I think Mary can speak Japanese because she has stayed in Japan." Bob: "I don't think so because her staying in Japan was too short to learn Japanese."
The situation is represented by the argumentation framework AF = ({A, B}, {(B, A)}) where A represents the argument "Mary speaks Japanese" by Alice and B represents the argument "Mary does not speak Japanese" by Bob. The AF has the complete labelling { out(A), in(B) } which means that the argument A is rejected and the argument B is accepted. In another day, Bob observes that Mary speaks Japanese. To explain this, he assumes an argument C that Mary studied Japanese hard to be able to speak it well.
The revised argumentation becomes AF = ({A, B, C}, {(C, B), (B, A)}) and is represented by the argumentation graph below.
' '
After introducing the new argument C, the situation changes: the revised AF has the complete labelling { in(A), out(B), in(C) }, where A and C are now accepted and B is rejected. It illustrates the situation in which a new argument is introduced to explain a new observation. Suppose another dialogue such that Alice: "I think the new iPhone will be selling well." Bob: "I don't think so because few people will get interested in this new model."
The situation is represented by AF = ({A, B}, {(B, A)}) where A is rejected and B is accepted. Later it is observed that the new iPhone breaks a sales record. Bob then withdraws his argument B and the revised AF becomes AF = ({A}, ∅). Then, the argument A is now accepted in AF . It illustrates the situation in which a previously believed argument is removed in face of a new observation.
To realize such explanatory reasoning in argumentation frameworks, it is necessary to introduce assumptions to an argumentation framework. In Definition 2.1, the set Ar of arguments is a subset of the universe U of all possible arguments. We then consider the notion of the universal argumentation framework which consists of the set of all possible arguments and attack relations over them. Definition 3.1 (universal AF). The universal argumentation framework (UAF) is an argumentation framework (U, att U ) in which U is the set of all possible arguments and att U ⊆ U × U is the set of fixed attack relations over U .
Every argumentation framework AF = (Ar, att) satisfies Ar ⊆ U and att = att U ∩(Ar×Ar). In this sense, AF is often called a subargumentation framework (sub-AF for short) of the UAF. An agent has an argumentation framework AF = (Ar, att) in which Ar is finite, and believes the validity of arguments in Ar. The agent has a belief on the labelling of every argument in Ar based on the attack relations in att under the designated semantics S. On the other hand, an agent can recognize the possibility of arguments in U \ Ar, but does not know whether those arguments are valid or not. The agent has no information on labelling of any argument in U \ Ar and each argument in U \ Ar is called a hypothesis. In what follows, an agent is identified with its AF.
When O = in(A) is observed, it means that there is an evidence for A. When O = out(A) is observed, on the other hand, it means that there is an evidence against A. In each case, an agent tries to skeptically or credulously justify O in his/her AF under a designated labelling. We consider that any meaningful observation contains no self-attacking argument, which is represented by the condition (A, A) ∈ att U . If an agent fails to justify O in his/her AF , it implies that AF believed by the agent is inaccurate or incomplete. In this case, the agent performs abduction to explain O.
Definition 3.3 (explanation).
Let UAF = (U, att U ) and AF = (Ar, att) a sub-AF. An observation O (by AF ) is skeptically (resp. credulously) explained by E = (I, J) under the S-labelling of AF E if O is included in every (resp. some) S-labelling L E of the argumentation framework AF E = (Ar E , att E ) where Ar E = (Ar \ J) ∪ I, I ⊆ U \ Ar, J ⊆ Ar, and att E = att U ∩ (Ar E × Ar E ). In this case, E is called a skeptical (resp. credulous) explanation of O (under the S-labelling of AF E ), and we say that O has a skeptical (resp. credulous) explanation E in AF .
An explanation (I, J) of an observation O is minimal if I ⊆ I and J ⊆ J imply I = I and J = J for any explanation
If E is a skeptical explanation of an observation O, then E is also a credulous explanation of O, but not vice versa. The notions of skeptical and credulous explanations coincide when AF E has the unique S-labelling. A skeptical/credulous explanation is simply called an explanation if the distinction between the two is unimportant in the context. In Definition 3.3, if O = in(A) (resp. O = out(A)) for some argument A, the goal of abduction is to produce a labelling of AF in which A is labelled in (resp. out). 
Then the following facts hold. In Example 3.1, the observation O 1 = in(A) has the credulous empty explanation in AF . This means that the labelled argument in(A) is credulously justified in the argumentation framework AF under the complete labelling. On the other hand, O 2 = out(A) has two minimal skeptical explanations in AF and both of them are non-empty explanations. This means that the labelled argument out(A) is not skeptically justified in AF under the complete labelling. To skeptically justify out(A), it is necessary to remove the argument C from Ar or to introduce the hypothesis D to Ar in AF .
By Definitions 2.5 and 3.3, an observation O is skeptically (resp. credulously) justified by AF E under the S-labelling iff O has a skeptical (resp. credulous) explanation E under the S-labelling of AF E . In particular, O is skeptically (resp. credulously) justified by AF under the S-labelling iff O has the skeptical (resp. credulous) empty explanation under the S-labelling of AF . An observation may have none, one, or multiple explanations in general. In particular, the next proposition holds. 
Proof. (1) in(A) is included in every S-labelling of the argumentation framework
Thus, O has a credulous explanation E = ({A, B}, Ar) under the complete, (semi-)stable, preferred labelling. In case of (A, B) ∈ att U , E is also a skeptical explanation under S-labelling. The only-if part follows by definition.
When an observation O does not have the empty skeptical/credulous explanation, O is not skeptically/credulously justified by AF under the S-labelling. In this case, a non-empty explanation E is likely to change not only the labelling of the argument arg(O) but the labellings of arguments other than arg(O) in AF E . In Example 3.1, for instance, the complete labelling
Thus, the explanation E 1 changes not only the labelling of A but also the labellings of B and C. The change of labellings between two argumentation frameworks is defined as follows. 
A skeptical (resp. credulous) explanation E of an observation O minimally changes AF if for any skeptical (resp. credulous) explanation F of O in AF , the following condition is satisfied:
If O has the empty explanation E in AF , then E minimally changes AF .
Example 3.2. In Example 3.1, the skeptical explanation E
When an observation has more than one explanations, explanations that minimally change the labellings of arguments in AF are preferred.
Definition 3.5 (preferred explanation).
Given an argumentation framework AF and an observation O, an explanation E is a preferred explanation of O if E minimally changes AF . A preferred explanation E is most preferred if it is also minimal (in the sense of Definition 3.3) among all of the preferred explanations of O.
Definition 3.5 says that there are two conditions for selecting the best explanations. The first condition requests that such explanations minimally change the labellings of the original AF . The second condition requests that the minimality of explanations. The first condition precedes the second one, that is, non-minimal preferred explanations are considered better than minimal non-preferred explanations. In particular, the empty explanation is always most preferred. By definition, we have the next result.
Proposition 3.2 If an observation O has an explanation in an argumentation framework AF , then there is a most preferred explanation of O in AF .
Computation
Next we provide a method of computing abduction in AF using logic programming. A normal logic program (or simply a program) is a set of rules of the form   A ← B 1 , . . . , B m , not B m+1 , . . . , not B n where A and B i 's are ground atoms (n ≥ m ≥ 0), and not represents the negation as failure operator. Let B P be the Herbrand base of the program P . Then, a 3-valued interpretation of a program P is defined as a pair I = T, F where T contains all ground atoms true in I, F contains all ground atoms false in I, and the remaining
. Among models of a program, the following models are important: partial stable models, stable models, L-stable models, regular models, and well-founded models. 1 An argumentation framework AF = (Ar, att) is transformed into the logic program P AF by identifying each argument with a ground atom as follows [28] :
Then, there is a one-to-one correspondence between complete (resp. stable, semi-stable, grounded, preferred) labellings of AF and partial stable (resp. stable, Lstable, well-founded, regular) models of P AF [10, 28] . We modify the transformation to characterize abduction in argumentation frameworks. Definition 3.6. Given UAF = (U, att U ), the associated logic program P UAF is defined as follows. For a set S of atoms, let 
Proof. We show the result for complete labelling. If O = in(A) has a credulous explanation E = (I, J) under complete labelling of AF E , then O is included in some complete labelling L E of AF E = (Ar E , att E ) where Ar E = (Ar \ J) ∪ I with I ⊆ U \ Ar and J ⊆ Ar. Using the result in [28] , T,
The converse also holds by the fact that a partial stable model T, F of P UAF is translated into a complete labelling
The results hold for (semi-)stable, grounded and preferred labelling using their equivalence to respective logic programming semantics [10] . The result of O = out(A) is shown in a similar way.
Finally, we remark some complexity results on abduction in AF. By Proposition 3.1, an observation O = in(A) always has a skeptical/credulous explanation, and O = out(A) has a skeptical/credulous explanation if A is attacked by some argument B which satisfies simple conditions. Thus, deciding the existence of an explanation given an observation is trivial or done in polynomial time. On the other hand, given a pair of arguments E = (I, J), the problem of deciding whether E is a credulous (or skeptical) explanation of an observation O under S-labelling has different complexities under different semantics. In case of O = in(A), E is a credulous (resp. skeptical) explanation of O under S-labelling of AF E iff A is included in some (resp. every) S-
where X is a new argument such that X ∈ U . For AF = (Ar, att), put AF = (Ar ∪ {A, X}, att ∪ {(A, X)}). Then, for any A ∈ U , E is a credulous (resp. skeptical) explanation of O = out(A) under S-labelling of AF E iff E is a credulous (resp. skeptical) explanation of O = in(X) under S-labelling of AF E . The next results hold by the complexity results in [14] . 
Debate Games
Suppose a debate between a prosecutor (P ) and a defense (D) in court.
The suspect is guilty because he had a grudge against the murder victim. D 1 : There is no evidence that the suspect killed the victim. No one is guilty until proven guilty. P 2 : There is an eyewitness who saw the suspect leaving the victim's apartment on the night of the crime.
The testimony is incredible because it was dark at night.
Given the argument P 1 by a prosecutor, the defense seeks an argument against P 1 . Once the defense successfully refutes P 1 by the argument D 1 , the prosecutor tries to refute D 1 . A debate continues until one cannot refute the other. An appropriate modelling of debate should allow for the following three properties: (i) players have different beliefs and opinions in general; (ii) during a debate, each player may revise its own beliefs by new information provided by the opponent; (iii) a player may use inaccurate or even false arguments to win a debate [25] .
Sakama [24] introduced a debate game based on an argumentation framework, which provides an abstract model of debates between two players and satisfies all three of the above requirements. We first review definitions of debate games. A player is an agent who has its own AF as a sub-AF of the given UAF.
Definition 4.1 (claim). [24] A claim is a pair of the form: (in(A), ) or (out(B), in(A))
where A and B are different arguments. (in(A), ) is read "A is labelled in", while (out(B), in(A)) is read "B is labelled out because A is labelled in". A claim (in(A), ) or (out(B), in(A)) by a player is refuted by the claim (out(A), in(C)) with some argument C by another player.
Definition 4.2 (revision). [24]
Let UAF = (U, att U ) and AF = (Ar, att) a sub-AF of the UAF. Then, a revision of AF with an argument X ∈ U is defined as
Definition 4.3 (debate game). [24]
Let UAF = (U, att U ), and AF 1 = (Ar 1 , att 1 ) and AF 2 = (Ar 2 , att 2 ) argumentation frameworks of two players P 1 and P 2 , respectively. Then, an admissible debate is a sequence of claims
-for each out(Z j ) in a claim by P 1 (resp. P 2 ), there is in(Z i ) (i ≤ j) in a claim by P 2 (resp.
For a player P 1 (resp. P 2 ), the player P 2 (resp. P 1 ) is called the opponent.
Let Γ n (n ≥ 0) be any claim. 
] is an admissible debate. In this case, the player P i who makes the claim Γ n wins the game.
The player P 1 starts a debate with the claim Γ 0 = (in(X 0 ), ) based on its argumentation framework AF 1 . The player P 2 then revises its argumentation framework AF 2 by X 0 , and responds to the player P 1 with a counter-claim Γ 1 = (out(X 0 ), in(Y 1 )) based on the revised argumentation framework AF 
A debate game for the argument A between two players proceeds as follows:
)" means that a player P i makes a claim (out(X), in(Y )) based on the argumentation framework AF k i . At first, the player P 1 has no information on the argument D, while the player P 2 has no information on the argument C. During the debate, the player P 2 learns the argument C by AF 1 1 , then introduces it to AF 2 2 together with the attack relations (C, B) and (D, C). The player P 1 learns the argument D by AF 2 2 but cannot refute it. As a result, the player P 2 wins the game. During a game, a player may make false or inaccurate claims to win the game. 
Consider a debate game for the argument A between two players as follows:
The player P 2 cannot refute AF 2 1 , then the player P 1 wins the game. In AF 2 1 , however, P 1 provides a false claim on E because E is out in his/her labelling.
(2) Let UAF = ({A, B, C, D, G}, {(G, D), (D, C), (C, B), (B, A) 
The player P 2 cannot refute AF 2 1 , then the player P 1 wins the game. In AF 2 1 , however, P 1 provides an inaccurate claim on G because G is not included in his/her labelling. In this sense, P 1 breaks the rule of admissibility of claims but P 2 cannot know it. 
A claim is called dishonest if it is either a lie or bullshit. A player is honest if every claim by the player is honest. Otherwise, a player is dishonest. .2(2)). To allow the existence of dishonest players who may bullshit, Definition 4.3 of debate games is slightly modified in a way that each player may claim an argument which is not in his/her AF [24] .
In a debate game, a player seeks a counter-claim which refutes a claim given by the opponent player. Viewing an argument given by the opponent player as an observation, computation of a counter-claim by a player is characterized by abduction as follows. and (out(B), in(A)) (or (in(A), ) ) be a claim made by a player P 1 under AF k 1 in a debate game.
If O = out(A) has the empty credulous explanation in
, then a player P 2 can make a honest claim (out(A), in(C)) that refutes the claim by P 1 .
Else if O = out(A) has no empty credulous explanation but has a non-empty credulous explanation
, then a player P 2 cannot make a honest claim but can make a dishonest claim (out(A), in(C)) that refutes the claim by P under the complete labelling. In this case, P 2 can make a claim (out(A), in(C)) with an argument C ∈ Ar
) E . In this case, P 2 can make a claim (out(A), in(C)) with an argument C ∈ (Ar
, P 2 cannot make a counter-claim (out(A), in(C)).
In this characterization, an observation is always labelled out. This is because the goal of a player is to justify O = out(A) or to explain it. When O has the empty credulous explanation, it is a most preferred explanation and a player makes a honest counter-claim. When O has multiple non-empty explanations, most preferred explanations are selected as best strategies. This is because a dishonest claim makes labellings of arguments deviate from those believed by the player. In Example 4.2(1), P 1 makes the dishonest claim (out(D), in(E)) but P 1 believes in(D) and out(E). A dishonest claim which increases such deviation is undesirable for a player because it would make difficult for the player to keep consistency during a debate and also increases the chance of dishonest claims being detected. However, selection of most preferred explanations as dishonest claims is not always successful. For instance, if the only explanation given for an observation needs to remove an argument that has already been used in the previous exchanges, then the player cannot hope to refute the opponent by hiding that argument. Comparing the lie (out(D), in(E)) by AF 2), lies are considered worse than bullshit. This is because the player P 1 knows the falsehood of (out(D), in(E)), while he/she does not know the truthfulness of (out(D), in(G)). There is no possibility of in(E) as far as F is in, while there is a possibility of in(G) as far as there is no attacker of it. These behavioral rules are summarized as strategies of a player P i as follows: The first item says selecting honest claims at first. The other two items provide criteria for selecting dishonest claims. The second one is used for avoiding lie detection, while the third one presents preference of bullshit to lies.
Related Work
Abduction and argumentation have been combined in different ways in the literature. Wakaki et al. [27] introduce hypothetical arguments to Dung's argumentation framework. They introduce abductive argumentation framework (AAF) which computes explanations to skeptically justify or not to credulously justify the argument supporting a claim. They consider concrete argumentation frameworks associated with abductive logic programs [17] under the answer set semantics. This is in contrast to our approach for abduction in abstract argumentation frameworks that have no restriction to any particular representation for arguments nor argumentation semantics. Moreover, in the AAF arguments are introduced to explain observations, while they cannot be removed from the knowledge base of an agent. In this sense, the AAF is based on the normal setting of abduction [17] , while our current proposal is based on extended abduction of [16] . Extended abduction is particularly useful when a knowledge base is nonmonotonic. In nonmonotonic theories, deletion of formulas may introduce new formulas. Thus, addition and deletion of hypotheses play a complementary role in accounting for an observation in nonmonotonic theories. Since an argumentation framework is inherently nonmonotonic (i.e., introduction/removal of arguments changes labelling in general), the use of extended abduction is more natural and appropriate. Deletion of arguments would happen when one notices that his/her previous argument was incorrect (see an example at the beginning of Section 3). For another case, one would withdraw his/her argument and make a concession (to reach an agreement), even if he/she has a counter-argument against the opponent.
Kakas and Moraitis [18] use abduction to seek conditions to support arguments. An argumentation theory is defined as a pair (T, P ) where T is a set of argument rules and P represents priorities over T . Then, a supported argument is defined as a tuple (Δ, S) where Δ is a set of argument rules from T and S is a set of hypothetical explanations. In their framework, an argument is a set of rules of the form l 0 ← l 1 , . . . , l n where l i is a positive or negative literal. Each literal l i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) in the conditional part can be a hypothetical explanation but it is not an argument. This is different from our setting where explanations are also arguments. For another difference, abduction considered in their framework is normal setting of abduction, which is different from our setting of extended abduction. A supported argument is also used for building a proposal or responding to a proposal in argumentation-based negotiation [19] . Argumentation-based negotiation is studied by other researchers as well (for instance, [1] ). A debate game is similar to argumentation-based negotiation in the sense that they use argumentation frameworks for formulating dialogues between competitive agents. However, the goal of negotiation is slightly different from debate-the goal of negotiation is to reach an agreement among players, while the goal of debate is to defeat the opponent player.
Sešelja and Straßer [26] integrate abduction and argumentation in their explanatory argumentation framework (EAF). An EAF is defined as a tuple A, χ, →, , ∼ where A, → is an AF, χ is a set of explananda, is the explanatory relation over A×(A∪χ), and ∼ is the incompatible relation over A×A. Thus, they distinguish attack relations and explanatory relations, and explananda and arguments. On the other hand, they do not distinguish arguments and hypotheses. Bex et al. [5] combine abduction and argumentation in the context of evidential reasoning. An argumentation framework is given as a pair (G, E) where G is a set of evidential generalisations and E is a set of evidences. The set O of observations is produced by applying evidential generalisations to evidences, and explanations (causal rules plus hypotheses) which account for the set of explananda F ⊆ O are selected. In this study, argumentation and abduction are combined in a way different from ours: arguments are used for generating observations supported by evidences and justifying explanations against observations. Bex and Prakken [6] apply the framework to a formal dialogue game. In the game, players try to find a plausible and evidentially well-supported explanation for the explananda. None of the players wants to win, since they have the joint goal to find the best explanation of the explananda. This is in contrast with debate games where each player seeks explanations to justify its own individual argument to win a game. In assumption-based argumentation (ABA) [13] , an argument is a deduction of a conclusion (claim) c from a set of assumptions S represented as a tree, with c at the root and S at the leaves. The goal of ABA is to construct an argument (tree) such that c is deduced from S using inference rules (S c). In ABA both a claim and assumptions are parts of an argument, which is different from our problem setting where arguments play the role of assumptions to explain another observed (labelled) argument.
Rotstein et al. [22] study argumentation theory change in abstract argumentation framework. A dynamic argumentation framework (DAF) has the universe U of arguments and the set A ⊆ U of active arguments. Given an argument X to be warranted, a dialectical tree rooted in X is modified by activating nodes in U \ A and by deactivating nodes in A to make X justified. They introduce argument change operators which expand the set A of arguments and contract some arguments from A. The goal of their study differs from ours in that their framework is dedicated to characterize dynamics of AF while abduction in AF is intended to reason explanations for/against a particular argument. Technically, their revision operators do not distinguish skeptical and credulous justifications. Baumann and Brewka [3] consider the problem of modifying an argumentation framework in such a way that a desired set of arguments becomes an extension. To this end, they add new arguments and attack relations to an AF, while they do not delete arguments because one could delete everything and add the wanted arguments without any attacks. We consider deleting arguments (and corresponding attack relations) as well as introducing ones, while preferring explanations that minimally change the original AF. Baumann [4] enforces a desired set of arguments by adding/removing a minimal number of attack relations to an AF. He then introduces value functions to compute different types of modification. In this study, the distance between two argumentation frameworks is measured by counting added/removed attacks. On the other hand, we measure the distance by comparing labelling of arguments in two AFs. In this sense, minimal change considered in [4] is syntax-based, while minimal change considered in this paper is semantic-based. Boella et al. [7, 8] consider the effect of adding/removing arguments or attack relations under the grounded semantics. Cayol et al. [11] study the effect of an addition of an argument on the outcome of the argumentation semantics. The goal of these studies [7, 8, 11] is identifying possible changes of extensions after revising an argumentation framework, which is in contrast with our goal of identifying possible changes of an AF to have a particular outcome. Rahwan et al. [21] introduce a formal argumentation theory in which an agent may hide arguments or make up new arguments to accept a particular argument. The purpose of their study is to develop a game-theoretic argumentation mechanism design and to characterize strategy-proofness under graph-theoretic conditions. However, they do not provide any computational mechanism of dishonest arguments. We show the use of abduction in debate games based on formal argumentation frameworks, especially computing dishonest arguments. Extended abduction is also used for dishonest reasoning in logic programming [23] . The current study shows that extended abduction in argumentation frameworks is used for computing dishonest arguments in debate games.
Conclusion
We introduced abduction to abstract argumentation frameworks and provided its computational method in logic programming. Next we showed its application to computing (dis)honest claims in debate games. The result of this paper realizes (extended) abduction in the context of AF and provides a connection between (extended) abduction, argumentative reasoning, and dishonest reasoning in AF. The abduction mechanism proposed in this paper will also be applied to revision of AF and will be realized in argumentation systems associated with logic programming. These issues are left for future work.
